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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL HOUSING* 
Michael Harloe 
Introduction - housing in the 1990s 
In a recently published study of housing in the EC countries, Roger 
Quilliot, the French socialist former Minister of Housing, refers to the 
high level of poverty and housing need in Europe (Ghekiere, 1991). Fifty 
million of the EC's 337 million population are poor and mainly badly 
housed and between 3 and 5 million actually homeless. Clearly, recent 
years have seen the re-emergence of a major shortage of affordable 
housing. In many countries, some housing issues are again appea~g in 
the political agenda. Concerns include the social, political and racial 
turmoil which surrounds some peripheral grands ensembles in France, the 
crisis of mortgage foreclosures and repossessions in the UK, the racially 
tinged conflict over access to and ownership of housing in reunified 
Germany and, most common of all perhaps, the rising tide of 
homelessness. 
And yet, in the 1970s, after thirty years of heavily subsidised large scale 
building activity, the belief was common that the long struggle to provide 
decent and affordable housing for the majority of citizens had been finally 
won. True, limited and localised problems remained, 'special needs' 
• Much of the thinking for this paper benefited from a stay at the Urban Research 
Program of the Australian National University in 1991. I am grateful to Professor 
Patrick N. Troy, head of the Urban Research Program, and his colleagues for their 
many kindnesses on this occasion. I have also benefited from the critical comments of 
Ingemar Elander, Christian Topalov and participants in the Orebro conference. Lastly, 
I acknowledge with gratitute the support of the Nuffield Foundation for the research on 
which this paper is based. 
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groups still had to be catered for. But in many countries these years 
seemed to herald the emergence of what George Sternlieb called the 'post-
shelter' society-housing economies and polities firmly focused on the 
expansion of home ownership and driven by financial concerns; profits for 
housing producers and financiers and capital gains for housing 
consumers-rather than by housing needs. 
The reasons for the collapse of this scenario in the last decade or so are 
complex. A key factor is the economic transition, as some describe it 
from a fordist to a post-fordist system, the collapse of old industries and 
the rise, frequently albeit on shaky foundations, of new consumer and 
financial services sectors. These changes polarized income distributions, 
with more highly paid and low paid jobs and fewer middle incomes. In 
addition, the ending of full employment has created new poverty stratum, 
which some label the underclass. Demographic and social changes, such as 
aging populations, increased marriage breakdown and single parenthood, 
have also swelled the numbers of the poor. Political turmoil has added to 
the low income housing demand, as remarkably high numbers of migrants, 
from the ex-socialist countries and further afield, have entered the housing 
market& of western Europe. Finally, there are developments in the 
financial system, deregulation and the shift from an era of low to one of 
high real interest rates, which have destabilised private housing markets. 
In some ways the contemporary situation is similar to that which existed in 
much of western Europe after 1945, certainly with respect to poverty and 
migration, although a very important difference then was the relatively 
unpolarised distributions of housing needs. In 1945 the housing shortage 
was widespread, affecting an extensive spectrum of income and socio-
economic groupings. Now the main burden of housing deprivation is 
concentrated among a more limited if growing population, those who are 
outside the labour market or who are in low paid and/or insecure 
employment. 
After 1945, despite the fragility of their economies, low levels of 
production and income and severe constraints on public expenditure, most 
governments placed a high priority on the expansion of house building. 
Subsidies for social and private rented construction, and in some cases for 
home ownership, were virtually universal i Although the balance of 
assistance to each of these sectors and means by which it was provided 
varied considerably, mass programs of social rented housing normally 
played a central role. Indeed, the lack of functioning private housing 
markets and low levels of disposable incomes meant that social rented 
housing became the key element in the national housing policies of left, 
centre and right wing parties. 
In 1992, in societies which, whatever their current difficulties, are far 
richer than they were in 1945, there are no signs of a similar concerted 
response to the new housing crisis. While individual governments make 
limited responses to the housing crisis, for example the recent German 
decision to provide a new shallow subsidy for a form of temporary social 
housing to meet the growing housing shortage among middle income 
groups in that country's big cities, and a failed recent attempt by the 
British government to stem mortgage repossessions, the survey of EC 
1 The term 'social rented housing', let alone 'social housing', has a variety of meanings. 
But social rented housing can be very broadly characterised as having three major 
characteristics. First, it is provided by landlords at a price which is not primarily 
determined by considerations of profit. Second, it is administratively allocated 
according to some conception of 'need'. Third, government control over social rented 
housing is extensive and has become more so over time. 
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housing policies mentioned above concludes that the last decade has seen a 
convergence in national housing policies around a model which is 
inadequate as a response to the growth of mass low income housing needs. 
The three main elements in this model are: first, an attempt to disengage 
the state from housing, or more accurately a redefinition of the respective 
roles of state and market; second, reduced support for housing investment, 
targeting the remaining state support on the poor through means tested 
consumption subsidies; third, the continued promotion of home ownership, 
with high levels of mainly indirect, regressive tax subsidies. 
The defects of this model, as a means of meeting moderate and low income 
housing needs, are legion. Perhaps it is not necessary to rehearse them 
here, as the growth of unmet housing needs in the 1990s indicates their 
lack of effectiveness. Rather the question to be pursued here is why the 
option of a social rented housing led model, as it was conceived in earlier 
years or in a new version, is an unlikely prospect. 
First however, it is important clarify what is being asserted when one 
refers to a private market led model of housing policy and the dim 
prospects for a social rented housing led alternative. As Murie and 
Lindberg have observed, in a paper which refers to the ending of the post-
war golden age of social rented housing, the declining fortunes of this 
housing are more advanced in some countries than others (Murie and 
Lindberg, 1991). It seems unlikely, for example, that the large scale 
privatisation of social rented housing occurring in Britain and Germany 
will be repeated, whatever some politicians might desire, in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, France or Sweden. In some cases national social 
rented housing stocks may become, like public housing in the USA, a 
residual sector housing economically, politically and socially marginalised 
populations. In other cases there is more likely to be an internal division 
between residualised projects and those which continue to accommodate a 
more mixed population2. So the prospect is not for a uniform, pristine 
private sector led system of housing provision and the reduction of all 
social rented housing to US style welfare housing, but a less well defined 
but clearly evident and varyingly constituted tendency in many national 
housing systems towards privatisation, higher rents, subject subsidies, 
lower investment and a wish to rely on the private market to supply 
mainstream housing needs. 
The immediate reasons why a social housing led approach has little appeal 
to so many governments and political parties are well known. The 
advancing disintegration, from the mid-1970s, of the economic, political 
and ideological systems which sustained the post-war welfare states, has 
put pressure on the public resources for social rented housing, weakened 
the political support for it and strengthened the position of those who 
oppose a collectively owned, semi-socialised service. The historical 
origins of such hostility lie in the golden years of liberal capitalism before 
1914 when social housing first emerged (Harloe, 1990). For thirty years 
after 1945 this viewpoint was largely ignored. However it was never 
eliminated. 
The re-emergence of such views has been aided by the many management, 
design and physical problems which now exist, notably among the large 
2 These national variations are explored in detail in my forthcoming book on social rented 
housing in Europe and the USA, on which this paper is based. 
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scale frequently high-rise, industrialised social rented housing projects of 
the sixties and early seventies. Rhetorical claims concerning choice and 
self-determination in private housing have been aided by well publicised 
examples of bureaucracy, inefficiency and degradation in some social 
rented housing. 
Explaining the changing fortunes of social rented housing 
For an earlier generation of social policy analysts, these immediate factors 
-a lack of popular and political will to expand social rented housing in 
response to growing lower income housing needs and public expenditure 
constraints-might have seemed explanation enough. However, the 
history of social rented housing shows that there has been no automatic 
correspondence between, for example, ideological hostility to such housing 
or constrained public finances, on the one hand, and a failure to support its 
expansion in practice, on the other hand. Jn the early 1920s and after 
1945, non-socialist centre and right wing parties supported mass social 
housing when national finances were highly constrained. So we need to 
explain why such a situation is not now likely to recur. 
A usefui starting point is to abandon the belief, implicit in many housing 
studies in the golden age of the post war welfare state, that provision of 
social rented housing has been determined, above all, by a recognition of 
the existence of unmet low and moderate income housing needs.3 Instead, 
it is useful to regard this as no more, at best, than a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition and ask why and under what circumstances has the 
existence of unmet housing needs led to this particular response in 
3 For a critique of such approaches see Harloe and Manens, 1984. 
capitalist societies. In fact, historical studies seem to indicate that in many 
such societies the normal wish is to set severe limits on the 
decommodification or socialisation of housing, more so than in the case· of 
some other elements of social provision such as income maintenance, 
education or perhaps health services. Here we will not explore why this is 
so, however, one factor may be the failure of most social democratic 
parties to promote radically decommodified, non-bureaucratised forms of 
socialised housing. More important, perhaps, is the strategic importance 
of private land, property ownership and finance capital in these societies, 
the deeply embedded interests which benefit from this situation and which 
defend it in depth. While major capitalist interests are involved in other 
areas of social need, historically they have been less powerful, entrenched 
and central to the capitalist economy as a whole. In this respect the agents 
of provision active in housing and the built environment more generally 
may be comparable with those involved in the other main arena of basic 
provision for human needs where private land and property ownership is 
of central importance, namely food production. 
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Here the purpose in analyzing the circumstances in which mass programs 
of social rented housing emerge is to obtain indications of the 
circumstances in which these programs do not emerge, in other words an 
explanation of why the new housing needs of the 1990s have not, as yet, 
and are unlikely in the foreseeable future, to provoke a significant reversal 
in the declining fortunes of social rented housing. 
Detailed work on the history of social rented housing in Britain, West 
Germany, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and the USA, suggests that 
there have been two, or perhaps two and a half golden ages of social 
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housing. The first period was brief, lasting from the end of the First 
World War to the mid-1920s in most cases. The second period, as 
Lindberg and Murie indicate, the real golden age of social rented housing, 
lasted from the late 1940s to the mid 1970s. Between these periods there 
was what might be called a half golden age, because the growth of this 
housing was far more variable, the depression years of the 1930s. 
Common to these periods was not just the existence of major housing 
needs, which the private market was patently unable to satisfy, but that 
these needs were of a wider social, economic and/or political importance 
in relation to the maintenance and reproduction of the social systems in 
which they occurred. In short, the rationale for the programs of mass 
social rented housing which occurred in these eras was to a very important 
degree 'externally' determined, that is determined by the role that social 
housing playedin meeting these system needs. 
Social housing between the world wars 
Inunediately after the First World War these needs were narrowly and 
unrealistically conceived by governments which took up and adapted pre-
war ideas about social rented housing, and embryo social housing 
institutions, to fashion the first significant subsidised social housing 
programs. Most western capitalist governments aimed to return as soon as 
possible to business as usual', reinstating the apparently smoothly 
functioning private economies with minimal state intervention that existed 
up to 1914. The restoration of the icon of liberal economics, the gold 
standard, symbolised this objective. Most western nations had returned to 
a form of the gold standard by the mid to late 1920s, at which point it was 
believed 'business as usual' had indeed been restored. 
The events of 1929-31 and the political and economic chaos that led to the 
Second World War put paid to this illusion. By then the first golden age 
of social housing was over. Enormous shortages of decent and affordable 
housing remained and the private housing market, which had been gravely 
afflicted by the war and its aftermath, was unable to replace state 
subsidised social rented housing in meeting these needs. However, the 
existence of unmet housing needs, and the discontent of the needy, no 
longer seemed (outside Germany at least) to pose a threat to social and 
political systems which had been in a fragile, and some thought terminal, 
state for the first five or so years after the war. 
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In short, social rented housing was no longer perceived as one means of 
restabilising society. Moreover, a key element in the return to 'business as 
usual' was a return to the private housing market. What made possible the 
transition, within a few years, from a situation of social conflict and 
tension to one of apparent stability, and thus to a situation where mass 
social rented housing programs could be terminated, were developments 
such as the widespread defeats of militant workers' and trades union 
movements in the early 1920s, divisions within the socialist bloc and so 
on.4 In fact the new social rented housing built in the years of turmoil 
mainly accommodated particular sub-sections of those who were in 
housing need after the war, skilled manual workers and the lower middle 
class, many of whom were engaged in the wave of worker and citizen 
militancy of these years, or who governments feared might become so 
engaged. In short, this housing was targeted on sections of the population 
4 For a detailed comparative account see Maier, 1975. 
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who were in housing need but who also had, temporarily, some political 
leverage. 
Most pre-1914 housing reform movements, dominated by middle and 
upper class elites whose main objective was to defend the social order 
against socialism, were unwilling to concede more than a very limited 
role, at best, for state subsidised rental housing (see Harloe, 1990). Most 
reformers, bound to the tenets of liberal economics, were deeply opposed 
to state intervention in housing markets. Many saw home ownership, not 
rental housing as the best way of ensuring that loyalty to the existing social 
order was reinforced among the 'respectable' working class. Those who 
did allow for the possibility of some state subsidised rental housing also 
imbued it with a wider social purpose, not just as a means of 
accommodating but also of disciplining and resocialising those who were 
variously labelled as the 'undeserving poor', the 'residuum' or, in a phrase 
which reveals all, the 'dangerous classes'. This purpose was particularly 
clear when some state subsidised housing was seen as the only way to 
rehouse and control those who lived in the urban slums of the larger cities, 
and to reclaim these areas for middle and upper class residence, commerce 
and public purposes. Of course such slum dwellers could not possibly 
afford even tolerably decent private rental housing. 
The proposals which linked social rented housing provision to slum 
clearance were not implemented in the immediate aftermath of the First 
World War. This was a model for a small scale program of residualist 
housing, focusing on those later labelled 'problem households'. In 
contrast, the post-war schemes for social rented housing construction were 
'mass' programs, targeted on a relatively wide range of somewhat better 
off groups. However, the pre-war concern for resocialising the working 
class was clearly still evident in post-war policies and plans (Magri and 
Topalov, 1987). 
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We can also identify in the early history of social rented housing a third 
model of provision which could be called the 'workers' cooperative' 
model. Before, during and after the First World War, workers grouped 
together to provide their own housing, through various forms of 
cooperative organisation. There were many links between these 
cooperatives and the trades unions and social democratic parties, notably 
in Germany and Derunark (and from the post-war period, in Sweden too). 
In some cases they formed part of a project to develop a distinctive set of 
working class social, economic and political institutions inside but apart 
from the dominant social order, a form of negative integration, as some 
historians describe it. Self-organisation and self-management, rather than 
state or other forms of bureaucratic control, that is forms of social and 
economic organisation which were implicitly or explicitly opposed to 
those of capitalism and the social housing conceptions of reforming elites, 
were what distinguished this model from the 'mass' model. The story of 
why these efforts failed, and why, in most cases, cooperative social 
housing became assimilated within the post-Second World War welfare 
states, is too complex to recount in this paper. However, it can be argued 
that this model could have provided the basis for the alternative to mass, 
bureaucratised welfare state style housing provision after 1945 which 
social democratic parties failed to deliver. 
As the need for 'mass' social rented housing declined, in most countries 
from the mid-1920s, for the essentially non-housing reasons already 
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mentioned, the trickle of construction which continued was increasingly 
justified in terms of the residual model of provision. And, as evidence 
from countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, which adopted social 
rented housing programs linked to slum clearance in the 1930s, shows, 
there was increased emphasis on a management style which stressed the 
need to inspect, discipline, re-educate and control the potentially feckless 
tenants who were to live in this housing. In contrast, the 'mass' housing 
built in the 1920s, targeted at the respectable working and middle class, 
was frequently managed in a rather more commercial style akin to that in 
the private rented sector, although elements of perhaps rather more 
benevolently expressed tutelage remained. 
In the depression years of the 1930s only a few countries reverted to a 
'mass' rationale for social rented housing. The common feature in these 
cases, which included the USA for the first time, was the use of social 
rented housebuilding in a public works strategy aimed at relieving 
unemployment and stimulating the private economy. In Sweden these 
macro-economic concerns were linked to the social and political objectives 
of the social democrats who came to power in this decade, but who were 
unable to implement their plans until the war was over. Elsewhere, mass 
social rented housing was only contemplated when private market 
conditions made it incapable of contributing substantially to employment 
generation, and only then in countries where some state action over 
unemployment was a political necessity. Thus in Britain, where for 
various reasons the private housebuilding market boomed in the mid to 
late 1930s, new social rented housing, as noted above, was ever more 
closely restricted to a residual role, an adjunct to slum clearance and 
modernisation of the urban infrastructure. In America, the pressures 
which led to public housing (a minor element in the New Deal social 
reforms) arose from the profound social crisis in the early 1930s and the 
persistence of high unemployment in later years. 
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This history suggests that two contrasting models of state initiated 
provision can be identified. First, the 'residual' model, targeted at the 
urban poor, with a rationale heavily influenced by the perceived problems 
of managing this group of the population, containing and perhaps solving 
the problems which it might pose for the wider society, and by the wish to 
facilitate the profitable reuse of inner city areas. The second, 'mass' 
model, involved essentially temporary larger scale programs of housing, 
targeted at the 'respectable' working class and sections of the growing 
white collar labour force, who might soon be catered for again by the 
private market, when there was a return to 'business as usual'. In the 
inter-war years the residual model began to be accepted as a necessary 
supplement to market forms of housing provision in some capitalist 
countries. The second form of provision, which entailed a more 
significant impact on the private rental market, only occurred under 
particular circumstances, when such provision contributed to the 
resolution or at least the management of crisis conditions. As these 
conditions faded the tendency was to revert to the residual form of social 
rented housing provision and leave the field free for the private sector. 
Social housing in an age of modernisation and economic growth 
1945-75 
After 1945 the need for mass programs of social rented housing 
construction, on a scale far beyond that achieved previously, was accepted 
by governments of many political complexions in Europe. Unlike the 
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period after the First World War, this response was not just a short term 
reaction to acute social unrest, before a rapid return to business as usual in 
housing, as in the economy. Of course, the war intensified already acute 
shortages of housing and these were a major social and political issue 
prompting state intervention. However, now a powerful additional reason 
existed for state subsidised social rented housing construction-its 
contribution to economic modernisation and urbanisation. While such a 
role was prefigured in the 1930s, notably in the plans of the Swedish and 
other social democratic parties, it only became accepted by a wider 
spectrum of political forces, and implemented, post-war. Social housing 
investment also became one of the tools of Keynesian style demand 
management, being frequently used to help maintain the new commitment 
to full employment and non-inflationary economic growth. 
Economic modernisation and growth, together with demographic changes, 
including the trend to smaller households, sustained major housing 
shortages and mass programs of social rented housing through the 1950s 
and 1960s. In the early years housing investment was tightly restricted, 
because of prioritised investment in industry, infrastructure and non-
,. 
housing welfare state programs and because of the relatively low levels of 
domestic income available for spending on housing. However, the picture 
began to alter as economic modernisation and rapid growth resulted in 
rising private and public sector resources. In the 1960s state expenditure 
on social programs rose sharply and social housing output expanded as 
governments pledged to finally eliminate housing shortages. However, at 
the same time rising personal incomes made possible a major upsurge in 
private housing output. 
Towards the end of the decade some shifts began to be apparent in the 
situation. There were increasing economic difficulties, as the post war 
'economic miracle' led to endemic inflation and a saturation in effective 
· demand. Growth rates began to fall. Also, as crude housing shortages 
were eliminated and the urban-industrial transition more or less 
completed, many governments again began to link social rented housing 
construction to modernisation of the urban system and thus to slum 
clearance, in some respects, therefore, reverting to the residualist model 
of social rented housing provision. 
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By the mid-1970s, home ownership was expanding rapidly, promoted-and 
aided by governments of many political complexions. While large scale 
urban renewal continued, increasing emphasis was placed on the 
rehabilitation of private housing (and some older social housing) rather 
than clearance and replacement. Moreover, stagflation and the increasing 
resort to austerity policies with deep cuts in public expenditure, reduced 
the public resources available for social rented housing. 
By now the politics of housing was being transformed. As home 
ownership came within reach of larger sections of the population, 
conservative and centrist parties rediscovered their preference for this 
tenure, reducing their support for social rented housing that had been 
engendered by conditions during the early post-war years. Social 
democratic parties had not achieved the transition from a private to a 
socialised housing system. In most cases this had not even been a serious 
objective, although Swedish policies seemed for many years to point in this 
direction. Economic growth and industrial restructuring changed the class 
structure, eroding the traditional electoral base for these parties. They 
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responded by broadening their appeal, moving from 'workers' to 'peoples' 
parties, accepting the main principles of the mixed economy of welfare 
capitalism. In country after country they dropped programs which 
included large scale state ownership of industry and socialist forms of 
economic planning, for example. Increasingly, what divided left and right 
wing parties was an argument over the extent to which the state should 
modify the distributive outcomes of the private market. 
As they sought to attract votes from white collar workers, and as the 
better off among their working class electorate began to become home 
owners, social democrats, with varying degrees of commitment, embraced 
the conservative preference for home ownership. Again with some 
variation, the social democrats began to adopt a conception of social rented 
housing, which scarcely differed in any fundamental respect from that 
adopted by the nonsocialists, namely that its main rationale was to 
accommodate the limited sections of the population unable to be housed by 
the private market. The politics of social housing centred on arguments 
between left and right over matters such as the size of the construction 
program and the levels of subsidies and rents, leaving unquestioned the 
,. 
revival and growing dominance of the private market. 
These politics of housing reflected a broader acceptance by social 
democracy of the boundaries between the state and the market (and the 
acceptable relations between the two) in the system of welfare capitalism 
which was established after 1945. Even before the policy shifts of the late 
1960s and 1970s these limits were evident, as the degree of socialisation of 
housing production, which had always been severely restricted, declined, 
due for example, to the removal of land price controls, the revival of 
private construction firms and increasing use of private finance. In some 
cases, notably Germany and France, the ownership of much of the social 
rented housing was also in commercial or petty capitalist hands as well. 
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Ironically, mass social rented housing programs had frequently benefited 
the private sector, sometimes at the expense of those who occupied it. It 
provided a useful, controllable instrument for state-led drives to 
modernise housing production, which favoured large scale construction 
firms. Developments such as high rise industrialised building did not 
occUI: in private housing markets, where consumers had some degree of 
choice, but social rented tenants had no choice except to accept whatey-er 
the producers, architects and planners, housing managers and politicians 
gave them. Although the high rise 'revolution' was a dreadful failure, 
many of the technical and organisational developments, together with the 
productivity gains through the use of standardisation, prefabrication and 
the substitution of unskilled for skilled labour, which it incorporated, were 
later transferred to low rise construction in the private sector. More 
generally, social rented housebuilding provided an important basis for the 
revival of the construction industry post-war and, at times when private 
orders declined, a means of sustaining activity and profit levels. 
A feature of post-war social rented housing, accepted by many social 
democrats as by non-socialists, was large scale, professionalised and 
bureaucratic housing management. In most countries, those forms of 
cooperative housing which descended from the workers' movements 
became more or less assimilated within the policies and procedures of the 
bureaucratised welfare state (although Danish social rented housing 
remained notable for its high degree of management decentralisation and 
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tenant influence). In Germany, which had experienced the most ambitious 
example of the social democratic project (along with Vienna) in the first 
three decades of the century, the social democrats and trade unions 
consciously turned their backs after 1945 on any wider societal role for 
social rented housing as they sought to broaden their appeal and to 
incorporate new sections of the labour force in their electorate. While 
much post-war social rented housing adopted the cooperative form in this 
country, few of these projects retained broad social objectives, many were 
professionally managed with tenants having little power. They became 
more inward looking, concerned to preserve and defend the benefits which 
state subsidies provided for their middle income tenants and frequently 
well paid managers, rather than pioneer and represent a radical alternative 
to the mass produced, large scale, bureaucratically and professionally 
managed, products of welfare capitalism. Such concerns were,-if 
anything, even more alien to the cooperative housing sector in Sweden 
which developed into a form, of home ownership, under the aegis of a few 
large scale, professionally administered organisations. 
Of course, this highly generalized, broad brush description of shifts in 
western European housing politics passes over significant national 
variations in the nature and timing of the changes which occurred. 
Economic and political circumstances combined to produce distinctive 
outcomes. Thus the shift away from socialised provision occurred far 
earlier in Britain and Germany, for example, than in the Netherlands and 
Sweden. In addition, some countries, such as Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, provided assistance to sustain private rental housing, although 
the long term decline of this sector accelerated as first the support for 
social housing and later for home ownership left it competing on 
increasingly unequal terms (Harloe, 1985). 
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An important variable in the fortunes of social rented housing was the 
degree to which it had a broad base of political support. In the mainland 
European countries social housing organisations exerted a considerable 
influence on most major political parties for many years, because they 
accommodated many white collar and skilled manual workers who voted 
for these parties, and because of the inclusion of organised labour interests 
within the leadership of parties such as the Dutch and German Christian 
Democrats. 
However, despite these national differences across Europe, it is the broad 
similarities in the pattern of social rented developments which seem most 
striking, especially when contrasted with the very different post-war 
history of US public housing. Here, as in Europe, economic growth, full 
employment, rapid urbanisation and major demographic changes created a 
high demand for new housing. However, the political and economic 
conditions which allowed a rapid growth of home ownership occurred in 
America a generation before they occurred in most European countries. 
So, when the public housing program was restarted in 1949, it was defined 
as a residual form of provision, very largely (in the big cities at least) 
being used as an adjunct to private sector, state assisted urban renewal 
operations, rehousing the urban poor. Moreover, the generalised political 
hostility to public housing, whipped up by the real estate industries, 
ensured that the accommodation was provided in a form and with a 
financial structure that was almost pre-programed to fail and to amplify 
the stigmatisation of its tenants. The crisis which public housing faced 
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from the late 1960s was an all too predictable outcome of the way in 
which it had been re-established in 1949. 
Social housing in decline: 1975-92 
Reference has already been made to some of the consequences from the 
1970s of the break up of the post-war economic order for social rented 
housing, such as the pressures to restrain public expenditure. This finally 
led governments to make changes in the financing of this housing which 
had been advocated in expert reports from the late 1950s-raising rents, 
reducing subsidies, and targeting assistance through housing allowances on 
lower income households (see, for example, UN Economic Commission 
for Europe, 1958). The higher rents combined with other factors, such as 
high subsidies for home ownership, escalating capital gains and low real 
interest rates on mortgages, to encourage an increasing flow of middle 
income households into home ownership. A paradoxical consequence of 
this was that new and costly social rented housing which had been 
constructed in the 1960s and early 1970s began to be occupied by low 
income households, aided by housing allowances, rather than by the better 
off tenants at whom it had been targeted originally. 
An outcome of these changes is that, while in many cases the existing stock 
of social rented housing has continued to accommodate a fairly wide range 
of income and social groups, the principal remaining new demand for this 
rented housing has narrowed and become concentrated on lower income 
households, including many who are outside the labour market. This 
change has been slower in some countries than in others, nor is it, on the 
whole, welcomed by the social landlords and their existing tenants who 
frequently resist government attempts to redefine and limit the role of 
social rented housing as housing for the poor. 
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However, the shift is reinforced by changing perceptions, on the part of 
some housing consumers, about the relative physical and environmental 
qualities of social rented housing vis a vis private housing. Negative 
evaluations of social rented housing have been amplified, for example 
through the media and by politicians, by the highly publicised failures of 
some of the expensive social rented housing built in the 1960s and early 
1970s. This housing, while it achieves high standards of space and internal 
amenities, is located in developments which are rejected by households 
who can pay for the private sector alternatives. For such households the 
choice between paying high rents and rapidly rising heating and other 
costs for this type of social rented housing, or buying a preferred form of 
housing which, throughout much of the past two decades, has also been an 
appreciating capital asset has not been a difficult one. They have opted 
increasingly for the latter. Moreover, such households are no longer 
prepared to accept the bureaucratic management regimes which have 
accompanied the growth of large scale social housing organisations, and 
which contrast poorly with what is frequently seen as the realm of 
freedom and self-determination in the private sector. 
However, the changing nature of the demand for social rented housing has 
not just occurred as a by-product of the loss from the sector of many 
middle income households. There has also been a growing replacement 
low income demand. Beginning in the 1960s in some cases, later in 
others, urban renewal and gentrification has sharply reduced the stock of 
poor quality private rental housing, which had been the major source of 
22 
accommodation, rather than social rented housing, for many poor 
households. In addition, various demographic and social changes, such as 
the growth of the aged population and of single parent households have 
added to low income housing demand. Moreover, the ending of full 
employment and economic restructuring, with the development of 
polarised urban labour markets in the last fifteen years, have added to this 
low income demand. In many countries a significant proportion of this 
economically marginalised population, concentrating in social rented 
housing, consists of those ethnic minority households and 'guest workers' 
and their descendants, welcomed by governments in the 1960s as their 
growing economies demanded a fresh supply of labour, but who are now 
locked into low income jobs or kept out of the labour market altogether, 
and who have frequently become the victims of racially motivated violence 
in recent years. 
It is important to emphasise yet again that this transition has been, and 
continues to be, a gradual process. In none of the European countries 
discussed in this chapter has social rented housing become purely the 
preserve of very low income households as it became many years ago in 
the USA. In many cases the longer established social housing tenants have 
a much wider range of incomes and occupational backgrounds, many of 
them have not been tempted into home ownership, in part at least because 
they frequently benefit from relatively low historic cost related rents. 
These tenants frequently concentrate in low rise, attractive developments 
built before and since the high rise era, leaving the latter, unpopular stock 
to the new, low income tenants who now form a high proportion of the 
new demand for social rented housing. The original expectation, that this 
latter stock would enable a process of internal filtering to occur, with 
lower income households able to occupy housing with low historic cost 
rents, has failed to materialize. 
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As many of the high rise projects have become increasingly problematic, 
the tendency to house there those who had little alternative choice but to 
accept such units and locations. has grown. Today the conditions in and 
problems of some social rented estates, which combine poor 
environmental quality, deteriorating structures and high concentrations of 
multiply disadvantaged households are producing a situation comparable 
with that which typifies much of the public housing sector in the USA. 
There are some interesting parallels to be drawn between the tutelary style 
of housing management which accompanied residual forms of social 
rented housing in the inter-war period, and the social service and crime 
control elements built into many of the rash of special programs which 
have sprung up across Europe in the last fifteen years to deal with 
'problem estates'. Once again, the issue is not just the provision of lower 
income accommodation, but also the management and containment of the 
marginalised urban poor. 
This reconstitution of social rented housing as residual housing for 
economically marginal groups varies in its current level of development, 
both within national stocks and, as already indicated, cross-nationally. In 
countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, where mass social rented 
housing became most strongly established and where it remains most 
strongly resistant to this transition, the changes are at a much earlier stage 
than in France or Britain, for example. Nevertheless, both countries have 
developed a residualised segment of social housing and with the changes in 
housing policy following the recent loss of power by the social democrats 
in Sweden and the Heerma memorandum, which aims to set Dutch housing 
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policy on a distinctively new direction in the 1990s, it is hard to argue that 
they are exceptions to the general processes of change described above.s 
In Germany the change is occurring as a large part of the social rented 
stock is freed from the requirement to house lower income groups, 
leaving a residual low income stock, mostly controlled by the local 
authorities. In Denmark the social housing organisations are trying to find 
a way of both preserving a more mixed population in socio-economic 
terms while accommodating government pressures to target their new 
letting on lower income groups. 
Conclusion 
By the early 1990s, following the breakdown over the previous fifteen or 
so years of the economic system and the compact between labour, capital 
and the state which had underpinned the 'long boom' and the policy 
regime of welfare capitalism, it seems that obituaries can truly be written 
to note the passing of the post-war golden age of social rented housing. 
The social and economic forces which led, after 1945, to the adoption of 
the 'mass' model of social rented housing in various advanced capitalist 
countries, have been dissipated and the reversion, in detailed forms which 
suit the distinctive circumstances of the times of course, to the more 
restricted residual model of provision is now well in train. 
5 See for example Lundqvist, Elander and Danermarh, 1990 for a discussion of the 
breakdown, since the mid-seventies, of Swedish social democratic housing policies and 
the emergence of polarization, between tenures and within the social rented sector. On 
the significance of the Heerma memorandum for Dutch housing policy, see Boelhouwer 
and Priemus, 1990. It should be added that these authors believe that the residualising 
tendencies which this memorandum seem to presage will be more or less successfully 
resisted, although the growth of a residualised sub-sector of Dutch social housing is not 
in doubt. 
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If this analysis is correct, we should not expect to see any return in the 
1990s to some form of more extensive and broadly targeted social housing 
provision simply because of the contemporary growth of unmet housing 
needs. Not unless such needs have a wider strategic significance for the 
functioning of the societies in which they occur will the residualising 
tendency be reversed. One scenario might be if the continuing fragility of 
the advanced capitalist economies leads to a disastrous collapse in the 
functioning of private housing markets and hence their ability to 
accommodate politically and economically key sections of the population. 
In various countries, at various times in the past fifteen years, this has 
seemed a real possibility, which might even have provoked a generalised 
crisis in the banking and financial systems of these countries, and 
internationally. 
Finally, while the focus here is on the two main models of social rented 
housing provision which have been dominant in different periods in some 
of the major advanced capitalist societies, there are two further models 
which a wider ranging analysis would also have to encompass. The first 
concerns the form of state housing provision developed in the former 
socialist countries. This is now in dissolution, with large scale 
privatisation of the existing stock and a shift in the main emphasis of new 
urban housing production to the private sector. Whether this seems likely 
to result in a (one-sided) convergence between patterns of housing 
provision in western and eastern Europe, or some new eastern variant, is a 
matter for debate (Hegedus and Tosics, 1991). 
The second model, already touched on, is that which can trace its origins 
back to early manual and white collar workers' cooperative housing 
projects. As noted above, this form of provision was assimilated within 
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the mass model in the post-war welfare states. Nevertheless, over the past 
few years there has been in many countries a growth of small scale and 
localised innovative forms of low to moderate income housing provision 
which are frequently characterised by some of the features which existed 
in many early workers' cooperatives, such as genuine tenant control of 
management and a strictly non-profit format.6 However, this revival of 
the cooperative model may face a cruel dilemma. On the one hand, it is 
unlikely to become a major alternative form of social housing provision 
unless it can move beyond its purely local basis and become incorporated 
in the program of one or other of the major political parties, presumably 
the social democrats. On the other hand, the incorporation within 
mainstream state housing policies might well lead to the destruction of the 
very features of autonomy and self determination which characterise this 
model and distinguish it from statist programs of mass social rented 
housing. However, not even this prospect seems likely at present for there 
is little sign of any reorientation of the housing policies of social 
democracy along such lines. 
6 For a study of such projects in three countries see Harloe and Martens, 1990 
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